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[32 ELR 10239]
The recent flurry of scholarship and debate1 over the use of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in environmental
policymaking is still largely academic. However strongly the academy feels one way or the other, the role of CBA in
environmental policymaking does not appear to be changing dramatically. Even the Senate confirmation of the
controversial John Graham to an important Office of Management and Budget (OMB) post2 is not likely to
substantially change policy, given the scrutiny his decisions will now receive. Undoing the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n,3 which upheld a U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
interpretation of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to establish ambient air quality standards without regard to cost,4 will
require an amendment of the CAA, an unlikely event given the persistence of congressional partisanship. This
Dialogue seeks to contribute to the growing body of scholarship that argues for a wider use of CBA, in the hopes of
winning over some of the last vestiges of resistance. Eventually, we hope that broader acceptance of CBA in the
academy and among environmental advocates will lead to its broader use in policymaking. We will press a now-
familiar argument that CBA is, if not an exact science, a better tool for decisionmaking than the alternatives, but we
will do so in a policy area that has heretofore been ignored: natural resource policy.
Fortunately for the economics profession, CBA has already insinuated itself into many environmental policy and
policymaking processes. The case of the ambient air quality standards at issue in American Trucking is not necessarily
representative of pollution control statutes; much statutory environmental law at least implicitly acknowledges a
"balancing" or "reasonableness" approach to standard-setting processes, if not explicitly calling for the use of CBA.5
Even where statutes call for standards to be keyed to technological feasibility, there is often an indirect mandate for
consideration of the costs and benefits of regulation.6 And in any case, President Ronald Reagan's Executive Order No.
12991, as modified by President William J. Clinton, requires CBA for any "major" rule or regulation, which is defined
as any rule or regulation that is likely to result in "an annual effect" on the economy of more than $ 100 million.7 Since
most significant environmental regulations have at least such an impact, this Executive Order is thought to [32 ELR
10240] cover most new federal environmental regulatory decisions anyway.
CBA and Natural Resource Policy
Where CBA has yet to make significant inroads is in the area of natural resource policy. To date, the use of CBA has
focused upon risk analysis applications and pollution prevention mandates. Yet it is in natural resource policy that CBA
may be even better able to act as a guide for policymakers, in helping to determine the appropriateness of exploitation,
preservation, or restoration of natural resources such as wildlife habitat, old growth forests, wetlands, recreation areas,
free-flowing rivers, and rare species. Techniques for valuing the benefits of preserving or restoring nonmarketed
natural resources have improved dramatically during the past three decades. The valuation of a broad range of direct
and indirect passive use values has accelerated in the past decade, since a blue ribbon panel commissioned by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (which included Nobel laureate economists Kenneth Arrow and
Robert Solow) lent its qualified endorsement of contingent valuation as a technique for the measurement of passive use
values of natural resources.8 And yet this endorsement, and the vindication of contingent valuation in Ohio v.
Department of the Interior,9 which upheld the U.S. Department of the Interior's (DOI's) use of contingent valuation as
a reasonable means of assessing natural resource damages under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),10 have served only to make contingent valuation legitimate in the eyes of
the judiciary. Its broader acceptance in the body politic and in agency practice has been slow in coming.
While the use of CBA is indeed a divisive issue, it has not been political partisanship that has stalled its widespread
adoption and use. Instead, lingering distrust by environmental organizations and by some members of the academy
have thwarted broader acceptance. The distrust is understandable, as past misuse of CBA has led to the approval of
environmentally and economically dubious projects.11 Indeed, one of the authors of this Dialogue was the author of a
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cost-benefit study that was nearly sabotaged by a naked political intervention seeking to affect the design of the cost-
benefit study.12 This unfortunate experience is not enough, however, to dissuade the authors from advocating broader
uses of CBA in natural resource policy. Without a formal decision analysis framework such as CBA, political influence
on agency decisionmaking would be even worse.
A second source of resistance to CBA is the perception that benefits estimates are less robust or less legitimate than
cost estimates, and that CBA therefore skews analysis away from environmental protection. Benefit estimations in risk
analysis have always been viewed with suspicion because, as Mathew Adler has observed, "death is different."13 Lisa
Heinzerling has also argued that risk reduction yields not just inchoate future benefits, but immediate ones in the form
or reduction of dread of a painful future disease, fear of premature death, and other fears of future events generated by
risk.14 These are objections that pose difficult, but not insurmountable, problems for economists. Similarly, benefit
estimates of natural resources, especially when they are based on contingent valuation estimates, are viewed as being
"soft." While such suspicion is understandable, we believe it is ultimately mistaken.
Economists are, of course, almost unanimous in supporting the broader use of CBA, but not necessarily for purposes of
maximizing their employment prospects. Rather, the profession is devoted to CBA because it is united in the belief that
information on benefits and costs will lead to better decisionmaking. Some experienced in environmental policymaking
point out that the asymmetry of information presented to a regulatory agency—when regulated industries weigh in with
their voluminous data on compliance costs against submissions from environmental organizations—does not
necessarily lead to better decisionmaking. This is not an argument, however, for a full-bore retreat on CBA. The
solution to faulty data and unbalanced information used as inputs is not to do away with CBA, but rather to correct the
data problems and temper the imbalance. And this can be done. To fix misuses of CBA, procedures should be written
into law that require agency compilation of information on the benefits and costs of natural resource preservation or
restoration, and provide that the information be of a sufficient quantity and quality and commensurate with the
magnitude of the decisions.15 This was the approach used by President Jimmy Carter when the U.S. Water Resources
Council issued CBA procedures, published in the Federal Register, for evaluating water projects as legally enforceable
[32 ELR 10241] regulations.16 Since that time, both the OMB and EPA have issued CBA procedures.17 In the long run,
more information does indeed make for better decisionmaking, and while CBA cannot be expected to always provide
precise numbers, even approximations will much more often than not improve a process that is frequently driven by
anecdotes and parochial politics.
While skeptics have on their side an impressive collection of horror stories of the misuse of CBA and of projects that
have gone forward despite an unfavorable analysis, they often overlook the positive role that it has played in
environmental policy. For one thing, one wonders if we would, as a general public, have even known about how silly
some of these projects were if it were not for CBA. CBA lends transparency to environmental policymaking. Indeed,
CBA has at least raised our awareness of important natural resource issues, such as below-cost timber sales and below-
market livestock grazing permits on federal lands. Why do these lose-lose projects persist? It is not because CBA has
propped them up. Even horror stories of bad projects for which CBA were done raise the question: would we even
have appreciated how bad they were without the CBA? Even if one persists with the argument that CBA has had an
overall negative effect on the environment so far, it is hard to see any alternatives that would be less so, including the
status quo.
A recent example of the transparency of CBA involved a project to expand a system of locks and dams for navigation
on the Mississippi River between Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Cairo, Illinois. The current size of the locks results in
delays for very large barge convoys, and the barge operators had pushed the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps)
for larger locks. The original economic analysis concluded that neither current delays of a few hours nor increased
delays of up to a day would justify the $ 1 billion lock expansion. Wanting badly to justify the project, however, the
Corps sought to convince their own economist, Donald Sweeney, to alter his CBA to make the analysis support the
project. When Sweeney refused to do so, and when the Corps replaced him with a panel of economists brought in to
perform the analysis, Sweeney contacted the Office of Special Counsel (an office that investigates allegations of
federal agency misconduct from employees). Sweeney's affidavit stated that the "new" economic analysis performed
after he was removed from the study made the project look feasible by unrealistically inflating the benefits and
reducing the costs.18 Embarrassed by the incident, the Corps asked the National Research Council (NRC) to review the
CBA, and suspended further work on its own. In February 2001, the NRC concluded that the Corps should evaluate
nonstructural alternatives to increase the efficiency of the current locks and make more realistic projections of barge
traffic before it considers expanding the locks.19 In August 2001, the Corps refocused its study to emphasize
environmentally more sustainable alternatives and the alternatives suggested by the NRC.20
In order to avoid such pitfalls up front, both the Corps and EPA now rely on outside panel review as a check on the
misuse of CBA before a whistleblower embarrasses the agencies. Both agencies have established boards of outside
economists, typically academics, that are sometimes called upon to review commissioned CBAs. Such a board
reviewed the CBA pertaining to the proposed breaching of the Lower Snake River dams,21 and recommended
numerous revisions and refinements in the economic analysis.
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Some Misconceptions About CBA
Some of the resistance to CBA stems from misconceptions about process and techniques, and a failure on the part of
the economics profession to vigorously respond. We seek to rectify that failure, at least in part.
Economists have been able to not only separate out use values of natural resources (such as the benefits of increased or
improved recreation stemming from an environmental improvement, or the benefits of improved human health
attributable to an environmental improvement) and the passive use values of natural resources (such as the value of
knowing that a particular species will continue to exist), but have developed sophisticated techniques to measure them.
Estimates of use values, or values stemming from tangible "consumption" of some natural resource, are considered
more reliable, because they are often based upon actual behavioral data. For example, if there is a consistent
differential in air quality within a region, differences in housing prices are apt to reflect a willingness to pay, or a use
valuation for cleaner air. This is true even when one statistically separates out other neighborhood effects, such as
crime rates, the quality of schools, and commuting distances.22 The value that people hold for job safety can be
estimated by measuring the premiums required to attract workers to a [32 ELR 10242] risky occupation. Again, it is a
straightforward statistical matter to separate out possible confounding factors, such as the degree of physical effort, the
number of hours worked, and the education level required. In addition, when restoration of natural resources results in
increased and improved recreational opportunities, the economic benefits of better recreation are measured by looking
at how much additional money people would spend on recreation to visit the restored site. This is accomplished by
comparing the amount of money that people are willing to spend to visit clean water recreation sites as opposed to dirty
ones. Since travel costs are often the largest part of such a recreational trip, differences in valuation can be teased out
by looking at how much further that people travel to visit the cleaner site. It is thus a relatively straightforward
calculation to measure how much more people would spend on improved recreational opportunities.
A common misconception is that CBA stops there. It does not. Much effort and research is devoted to the measurement
of nonuse or passive use values. These values are somewhat more difficult to measure, although much progress has
been made recently. Here economists have contributed to policymaking by defining different types of passive uses, and
by forcing us to think about the many reasons we value natural resources. They have introduced such concepts as
existence value, the benefit derived from knowing that a particular natural resource exists in an unimpaired state, even
if the individual does not visit or use the resource on-site, and bequest value, the benefit the current generation derives
from knowing that protection of natural resources today will provide future generations with unimpaired natural
resources.23
Economic analysis also recognizes the benefits accruing from ecological services provided by natural resources.
Indeed, sound economic analysis explicitly includes consideration of the value of inputs to production, such as the
ecosystem services provided by natural resources. For example, the benefits of healthy estuaries are inferred from their
service as nurseries for commercially important fish species. Interdisciplinary teams of economists and ecologists are
at the forefront of developing indicators of wetland health, as expressed in terms of the multiple ecological functions
provided by wetlands.24 Even the federal government's insurer for imprudent land uses, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), has recently shown signs of awakening to the considerable costs of local developer
obstinacy. It has begun to object to projects that it knows it will have to pay to rebuild when the next 100-year flood
occurs in 5 or 10 years' time.25 Among the benefits considered by FEMA of prohibiting a risky project include benefits
of protecting the natural resources from development.
In particular, the survey technique of contingent valuation is often criticized, even parodied as "a dartboard of valuation
techniques."26 Flippant caricatures of contingent valuation are a disservice to the scores of economists that have
devoted their careers to developing ways of asking questions so as to elicit economic preferences. While there is still
much work yet to be done, it is worth taking note of the strides that have been made thus far. To deal with the problem
of the hypothetical nature of contingent valuation surveys, economists have compared responses given to surveys that
posed hypothetical payments, and to surveys that would require respondents to actually pay up.27 To calibrate the
survey responses to better match the actual cash amounts, respondent certainty scales are elicited and applied to the
survey responses.28 To deal with the problem that respondents often do not adequately consider their budgetary
constraints, economists have reminded respondents of their constraints.29 To deal with the problem that respondents
have difficulty placing natural resources in a proper perspective, e.g., properly considering the saving of one
endangered species in the context of the larger problem of conserving biological diversity generally, economists have
developed surveys that present substitute environmental goods.30 Perfect fixes for all of the problems associated with
contingent valuation have not been developed, but there are adequate means for dealing with them. Moreover,
contingent valuation can make the modest but important claim that its results are consistent with economic theory, in
this respect: the higher the price individuals are asked to pay for protection of a natural resources, the less likely
respondents are to be in favor of it. Contingent valuation surveys do in fact show downward sloping demand curves, as
predicted by economic theory.
[32 ELR 10243]
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Our checkered history of natural resource management could have been much better had CBA been utilized to act as a
check on, for example, U.S. Forest Service below-cost timber sales, public land below-market grazing permits, or our
past frenzy of dam construction. Estimating the monetary benefits of preserving timber stands or a wildlife refuge
provides balance to political lobbying by industry that often muddies the policy process by touting additional local jobs
as a primary economic benefit of a resource extraction project. Further, industry frequently focuses largely on the cost
of complying with resource protection policies such as roadless area protection. The real economic question is not,
however, whether an increase in environmental quality will cost businesses or consumers money. In most cases it will.
But the legitimate economic question is whether the gain in environmental quality is greater than that cost. Without
CBA, the focus in Congress will continue to be on the costs of environmental regulation, to the exclusion of
consideration of benefits.
Implicit Versus Explicit CBA
Even in cases in which the consideration of costs is supposedly prohibited, CBA is often quietly and implicitly
conducted by the agency. The prohibition on explicit consideration of costs in those cases frequently merely serves to
drive the process underground. When first enacted, the CAA program to control emissions of hazardous air pollutants31
called for health-based national emission standards for hazardous air pollutants (NESHAPs), without consideration of
cost. Twenty years later, EPA had completed only seven NESHAPs. Congress gave up on EPA, and changed the
NESHAP-setting process to be technologically based, but with explicit consideration of costs and benefits.32 What had
been happening all along, it was clear, was that EPA had been effectively conducting CBA to aid in the establishment
of NESHAPs, and the 1990 Amendments that effected this change simply guaranteed that the process would thereafter
be subject to public scrutiny. Another example can be found in the legal contortions undertaken by the DOI under the
Reagan and Bush Administrations to avoid enacting protections for the northern spotted owl. Separate lawsuits were
filed by environmental organizations to compel then-Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel to list the owl under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA),33 and to compel Secretary Manuel Lujan to designate a critical habitat for the owl.34
Nobody thinks that the ESA's prohibition on consideration of cost in the listing process had any effect at all, except to
allow Hodel to mask his nakedly political preferences.35
Thus, perhaps the strongest argument that can be put forward on behalf of formal CBA is on process grounds. Just as
the National Environmental Policy Act indirectly effected profound substantive changes in environmental policy, CBA
has the power to dramatically alter the way we think of environmental protection. Eric Posner's article insightfully
captures the basic problem that environmental advocates have with CBA, a belief that agency bureaucrats such as those
at EPA are fundamentally more pro-regulation than the general public, and that CBA will inevitably have the effect of
pulling agency decisions "rightward."36 This is not necessarily the case. For one thing, EPA and the DOI have been
sued not only by regulated industry groups but also by environmental advocacy organizations, quite frequently.
Perhaps the memories of Anne Gorsuch and James Watt are not fresh enough in our minds. Secondly, this fear is based
upon the perception that cost estimates will continue to dominate benefit estimates. This is also not necessarily true.
Estimates of passive use values of Mono Lake as a habitat for birds were much greater than the foregone value of the
water for use by Los Angeles.37 Similarly, the passive use values of the free-flowing Elwha River, which provided
salmon habitat, were found to outweigh the foregone benefits of the Elwha Dam.38 Skepticism of benefits estimates is
due largely to misconceptions and the undeserved caricaturing of the benefit estimation process, particularly as it
involves contingent valuation. While no one claims that benefits estimation is an exact science, it has clearly become a
well-developed science. Benefits estimates yield useful information in the policymaking process. Also, CBA helps to
lay bare industry arguments against more stringent regulation or natural resource preservation or restoration. We have
learned from CBA how to be skeptical of industry cost estimates. A recent Resources for the Future study found that
cost estimates are consistently overestimated,39 which should not come as a great surprise given the influential role that
regulated industries have to play in this process.40 Again, this is reason to engage in independently conducted cost and
benefit analyses, rather than to simply give up on CBA. We should more carefully scrutinize cost estimates, and refine
methodologies for estimating benefits.
There is a caveat to our appeal to greater use of CBA for natural resource problems, which pertains to intergenerational
[32 ELR 10244] issues. While bequest value is capable of capturing the value that we, the present generation, place on
leaving our environment in the same condition as we received, the valuation of future generations is assumed to be
equal to a continuation of our preferences over the life of the project or policy. In theory, it is conceivable that an
ethics-based approach41 would better represent the politically unrepresented future generations. However, the political
reality of an ethics-based approach is quite different. Even were we to agree as a society that intergenerational equity
should serve as a guiding principle in environmental and natural resource policy,42 there are simply too many avenues
of political circumvention that would defeat the ultimate achievement of such an objective.
Thus, for a variety of reasons, CBA is not appropriate as a hard and fast decision rule. CBA does not purport to and
should not attempt to displace a variety of other considerations. For example, bequest value and existence value may
not completely capture the value of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), or any risk of loss thereof.43 The
value of the ANWR as an ecological "reference site"44 may trump measurable economic benefits associated with
preservation.45 That the ANWR may provide research benefits and ecosystem services that are immeasurable (at least
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for now) does not mean that CBA should not be done. It should be performed, but with responsible caveats noting the
possibility of many as-yet unknown values, and the irreversibilities of moving forward with exploration. If CBA is
made to serve the same purpose as an environmental impact statement (EIS)—as an important procedural step in
policymaking—then it is hard to see how the process could be the worse off for it. CBA should serve as an explicit
acknowledgment that an agency has considered the cost and benefits of its proposed actions, and considered
alternatives that may yield the same result with lower costs or higher benefits or both. In the case of ANWR, it is likely
that there are an array of other energy policy options that could safely replace the oil and gas not retrieved from the
refuge. At the same time, while CBA need not be binding as a decision rule, it should also, like the findings of EIS, be
taken seriously and be the subject of public scrutiny and debate.
Ultimately, increased use of CBA is a movement toward government by laws, not men. We should embrace CBA, not
because it is an exact science, but because it improves the decisionmaking process. CBA represents the interests of
taxpayers and consumers, who often foot the bill in special interest projects or through legislation that is not in the
national interest. Moreover, even a bad CBA, skewed in favor of exploitation of natural resources, is worth looking at,
if only to focus on what is wrong with exploiting the natural resource. It is harder work to object to a bad CBA than it
is to counter with a "poignant anecdote to suggest an approach that promotes . . . parochial interests."46 But it is a more
honest and constructive way of dealing with such issues than to re-use or repackage some rhetoric such as "it is a bad
day for the environment, and it is a great day for industry." It is time that we stopped avoiding looking at CBA for fear
of becoming pregnant with information that we do not want. The demagogic politics of environmental and natural
resource policy should give us a clue as to how difficult these problems are. We need all the help we can get in solving
them.
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